🇪🇹 ETHIOPIA STABILITY INDEX

An active insurgency has been underway in Amhara Region since April 2023 — the Fano militia (formerly Federal Government ally) now in open conflict with ENDF.

Background:

• Fano origins: Loose Amhara nationalist militia network; historically self-defense focus.
• Tigray War alliance: Fano fought alongside ENDF against TPLF (2020-2022); some atrocities documented against Tigrayans, especially in Western Tigray.
• April 2023 break: Federal Government attempt to absorb Fano into regional security forces triggered armed resistance; Fano now opposes federal authority.

Conflict Dynamics:

• State of emergency: Federal government declared State of Emergency in Amhara August 2023; renewed multiple times.
• Major cities affected: Lalibela, Gondar, Bahir Dar, Debre Birhan — repeatedly contested.
• ENDF operations: Significant military presence; civilian casualties documented; aerial bombing of Amhara urban areas reported.
• Fano factionalism: Multiple Fano commanders without unified command; complicates negotiation prospects.

Humanitarian Impact:

• Displacement: Hundreds of thousands of IDPs across Amhara.
• School closures: Major education disruption.
• Healthcare collapse: Hospital damage; medical supply disruption.
• Drone strikes: ENDF drone strikes reported throughout 2024-2025; civilian casualties.

Political Implications:

• Federal credibility: Amhara Region was historically supportive of Abiy government; insurgency reflects significant erosion of that base.
• Ethnic federalism debate: Crisis revives questions about Ethiopia's ethnic federalism structure.

The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has waged a low-intensity insurgency in Oromia Region — Ethiopia's largest and most populous region — since the late 2010s, with major escalation since 2018.

OLA Background:

• Origins: Splinter from Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) when OLF accepted Abiy Ahmed's 2018 amnesty; OLA refused.
• Leadership: Jaal Marroo (Kumsa Diriba) is OLA's most senior commander; remains underground.
• Affiliation question: Government designates OLA as "Shene" — disputed terminology; OLA rejects "Shene" label.

Conflict Profile:

• Geographic scope: Western Oromia (Wollega zones) most active; also Bale, Guji, parts of Shewa.
• Operations: Ambushes on ENDF, attacks on civilian targets, kidnappings for ransom.
• Ethnic violence: Atrocities against Amhara civilians in Oromia documented (Tole, Gimbi attacks); OLA denies but observers attribute to OLA or affiliated militias.
• Counter-insurgency: ENDF + regional Oromia Special Forces conduct major operations; significant civilian casualty allegations.

Talks Track:

• Tanzania talks (2023-2024): Multiple rounds of negotiations in Tanzania between government and OLA; collapsed without agreement.
• Mediation: Norway and Tanzania have played mediator roles; no durable breakthrough.

Strategic Significance:

• Demographic weight: Oromo are Ethiopia's largest ethnic group (~35% of population); Oromia insurgency is politically central.
• Abiy's base: Abiy himself is Oromo; OLA insurgency challenges his political legitimacy within Oromia.

Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions have escalated dramatically since the Pretoria Agreement — driven by Eritrean dissatisfaction with the deal, sea access disputes, and shifting regional alignments.

Tension Drivers:

• Pretoria exclusion: Eritrea was not party to the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement despite participation in war; Asmara felt sidelined.
• Sea access aspirations: Abiy Ahmed publicly raised Ethiopian sea access demands (Oct 2023); seen as implicit threat to Eritrean/Djibouti ports.
• Assab port focus: Eritrean port of Assab — closest Red Sea port to Ethiopia — particular focus of Ethiopian rhetoric.
• Border deployments: Both countries have increased force deployments along shared border throughout 2024-2025.

Indirect Conflict Pathways:

• TPLF-Eritrea outreach: Reports of TPLF (former Eritrean wartime adversary) reaching out to Asmara; would be major strategic realignment.
• Tigray proxy potential: Both countries could attempt to use Tigrayan factions against each other.
• Sudan war intersection: Different positions on Sudan war (Eritrea hosted SAF leadership; Ethiopia more neutral).

Regional Alignment Shifts:

• Egypt-Eritrea ties: Egypt has cultivated Eritrea as ally against Ethiopia (GERD dispute backdrop).
• UAE positions: UAE has historically been close to Asmara; relationship with Addis Ababa more transactional.
• Russia engagement: Russia has cultivated relationships with both Eritrea and Ethiopia; potential mediator or potential complicator.

War Risk Assessment:

• Analyst consensus: Multiple Horn of Africa analysts have raised significant war risk concerns 2024-2026.
• Catalysts: Sea access maneuver, Tigray flashpoint, succession in Eritrea (Isaias is 79), or regional alignment shifts.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is Africa's largest hydroelectric dam and one of the world's largest — and has been the focal point of one of Africa's most consequential geopolitical disputes for over a decade.

GERD Profile:

• Location: Blue Nile River, near Ethiopian-Sudanese border.
• Capacity: 6,450 MW installed; ~74 billion cubic meters reservoir.
• Construction: Began 2011; reservoir filling 2020-2023 (five filling cycles); final filling completed Sept 2023.
• Power generation: Both turbines now operational; significant Ethiopian power addition.
• Cost: ~$4.8 billion, primarily Ethiopian-funded (no World Bank financing due to Egypt objections).

Egypt's Position:

• Existential framing: Egypt depends on Nile for ~97% of freshwater; any disruption affects food security and population stability.
• Historic colonial-era treaties: 1929 and 1959 agreements (which Egypt cites) allocated Nile water primarily to Egypt and Sudan, excluding Ethiopia.
• Climate vulnerability: Egypt argues GERD operations during drought years could devastate downstream water availability.
• Sisi public statements: Egyptian President al-Sisi has publicly warned that no scenario is "off the table" regarding GERD.

Sudan's Position:

• Mixed historical position: Pre-war Sudan oscillated between Ethiopian and Egyptian alignment on GERD.
• Civil war complication: Sudan war (2023+) has reduced Sudan's diplomatic role; SAF and RSF take different positions implicitly.

Negotiation Track:

• AU mediation: African Union has hosted multiple rounds; no binding agreement reached.
• 2023 failures: Egypt-Ethiopia talks broke down December 2023; no further high-level negotiations since.
• De facto outcome: Ethiopia completed filling unilaterally; Egypt unable to block; situation now centers on operational coordination rather than filling rights.

Strategic Implications:

• Power transformation: GERD significantly increases Ethiopian electrical capacity; power exports to neighbors (Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya) growing.
• Precedent: Outcome shapes future African upstream-downstream water disputes.
• Egypt's responses: Has deepened ties with Eritrea, Somalia; pursued military modernization; engaged in Horn diplomacy partly through anti-Ethiopian frame.

US-Ethiopia relations remain consequential — Ethiopia is Africa's second-most populous country (~125 million) and historically a major US security partner. Relations were strained by the Tigray War and remain calibrated.

Bilateral Framework:

• US Embassy Addis Ababa: Major diplomatic post; AU permanent mission also based in Addis.
• AU headquarters: Addis hosts African Union; gives the US embassy expanded regional role.
• USAID: Historically a major donor (food security, health, humanitarian); under 2025 cuts pressure.

Tigray War Aftermath:

• AGOA removal (Jan 2022): Ethiopia removed from AGOA over Tigray War atrocities; significant economic impact especially on textile exports.
• Sanctions: US OFAC and visa restrictions on Ethiopian and Eritrean officials linked to atrocities.
• 2023 partial restoration: Post-Pretoria Agreement, some US engagement resumed; AGOA NOT restored.

Current Tensions:

• Sea access concerns: US has expressed concern about Ethiopian sea access rhetoric and Somalia MoU.
• Somaliland MoU (Jan 2024): Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU for sea access caused major regional crisis; US has navigated cautiously between Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland.
• Amhara crisis: US has expressed concern about civilian casualties in Amhara operations.

Strategic Cooperation:

• Counter-terrorism: Joint counter-Al-Shabaab cooperation; though Ethiopia has scaled back ATMIS contribution.
• Humanitarian access: Ongoing US pressure for humanitarian access in conflict zones.

Watch Items: AGOA potential reinstatement; Eritrea war risk; Tigray Interim Administration stability; Amhara conflict trajectory; Trump administration approach.